



Natural Resources as the Empire's (Dis)Integrative Force

The Case of Bosnian Timber Exports in the Late Habsburg Empire

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Introduction

On 28 April 1903 at the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies (*Abgeordnetenhaus*), the Minister-President Ernest von Koerber received an interpellation regarding Bosnian timber exports. According to the deputy Georg von Schönerer and his colleagues, the increasing presence of Bosnian timber on the Mediterranean market was causing major economic harm to Austrian forestry.¹ The 'scrupulous forest management' of Austria-Hungary's Provincial Government in Bosnia, the *Landesregierung*, expressed through inter alia low stumpage taxes, enabled the enterprises operating in Bosnia to substantially underbid on the market. Consequently, the Alpine regions experienced a major decline in profitable sales, whereas Bosnian sales rose, reaching as high as one quarter of Austria-Hungary's total timber export to Italy by volume. Schönerer's prognosis was not a bright one from the perspective of timber enterprises in the central crownlands. With reference to the completion of the forestry railways operated by the enterprise Otto Steinbeis Aktiengesellschaft and connecting Bosnia to the Adriatic Sea (as the northernmost arm of the Mediterranean Sea), he foresaw a steady rise in Bosnian mass production of timber products. As he and his comrades stressed, the prospect of annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was promising to further intensify and endanger Austria's economic situation. The interpellation was meant to reach out to the deputies of all Cisleithania's crownlands, whom he was trying to mobilize against the prospect of annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina. To counteract any attempt to integrate this occupied region into the Empire would, as he emphasized, serve Austria's economic self-interests.² Schönerer's interpellation represented a political follow-up to controversies that were already playing out in the imperial media space. A furious debate on the harm done by Bosnian timber exports had been set in motion one month

earlier. The ever-expanding timber exports from Bosnia became such a central subject within the Habsburg imperial space that they soon offered a suitable opportunity to mobilize against any prospect of political integration. After all, and given his strong anti-Slavic politics, Schönerer's major concern was not so much Bosnian timber exports and their economic effects on the rest of the Empire, but rather counteracting any further integration of a region populated by Slavs.³

By the time these proposals were articulated, Austria-Hungary was looking back on a 25-year-long occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which began in 1878 in the wake of political decision-making at the Berlin Congress, and an even longer history of forest extraction in the region. By 1903, however, Bosnian timber exports had developed sufficiently to earn major criticism from metropolitan producers of timber within the Habsburg Empire. This chapter strives for an in-depth historical analysis of processes at the intersection of natural resource extraction and imperial governance in the late Habsburg Empire. It does so by focusing on the case of timber exports from Habsburg Bosnia between 1886 and 1913. This period was marked by a series of political controversies surrounding Bosnian forestry that were fought out in different arenas, including media and a variety of imperial political spheres.

On the conceptual level, the study employs two separate concepts: cooperative empire and ecological nationalism. It advances them by analytically relating these two concepts to each other and by offering new empirical approaches. The empirical analysis is grounded in a combination of archival sources from the State Archive of Bosnia that offer insights into the policy-making of the Habsburg Common Ministry of Finance and the Provincial Government in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as media materials of that time, published in German and Croatian.⁴ It argues that environmental history offers new and hitherto underused optics for understanding some patterns of late Habsburg imperial governance on a pan-imperial level. It also offers a more nuanced understanding of the mechanisms and forces that worked towards integration but also disintegration on multiple spatial levels during the late Habsburg period.

Cooperative Empire versus Ecological Nationalism: A Research Overview of Two Separate but Related Fields in New Imperial History

Recent scholarship in new imperial history has offered important revisions to our understanding of late Habsburg governance.⁵ In 2016, the historian and legal scholar Jana Osterkamp, also one of the contributors to this anthology,

proposed the concept of 'cooperative empire' as a way of developing a better understanding of the political practices and mechanisms in the late Habsburg Empire. According to Osterkamp, these were marked by different forms of cooperation between the different regions of the Empire, the result of several bottom-up initiatives by the Cisleithanian crownlands, often coincidental with financial crises.⁶ 'Cooperative empire' invites us to approach Habsburg history on a pan-imperial level, exceeding previous practices of compartmentalising imperial history along the regional units of individual crownlands. Finally, it convincingly counteracts previously dominant understandings of the late Habsburg Empire as a polity that was torn apart by centrifugal political forces in forms of nationalisms, which eventually led to its disintegration in the wake of the Great War. Without neglecting the existence of nationalist movements in the Empire as a way of articulating particularistic economic and political interests, this concept reshifts the focus towards centripetal forces within the Empire. (Nationalist) competition became replaced by forms of cooperation.

Two years later, in 2018, Osterkamp published an edited volume on cooperative empire in which a number of scholars operationalized the concept by testing its applicability to different fields of imperial governance, including economy, education, military coordination and infrastructure building, as experienced in different parts of the Empire.⁷ This collective endeavour shows that most of these sociopolitical spheres were marked by political practices of both vertical cooperation between the imperial centre and the crownlands and horizontal cooperation in which the crownlands no longer acted as competitors, but also collaborated as partners across regional boundaries.⁸ Within this frame, the case of Habsburg–Bosnia has been studied, but separately from other Cisleithanian lands, and primarily by looking at collaboration among the different ethno-confessional groups of the Bosnian population. As Heiner Grunert has shown, political representatives of Bosnian Muslims, Orthodox Christians and Catholics collaborated across religious boundaries in their efforts to acquire political autonomy.⁹ This chapter contributes to the existing field by studying Bosnia and Herzegovina as a determining factor in certain integration processes on the pan-imperial level.

To date, nature and its management have remained outside the analytical scope of the cooperative empire paradigm, despite the fact that the appropriation and utilization of natural resources in the late nineteenth century were important means of exercising power by the Habsburg Empire. This chapter aims to advance the discussion on cooperative empire by applying this concept to timber extraction and trade in the Empire. Habsburg timber trade was not only a sum of the individual regions' timber trade (namely in Tyrol, Carinthia, Styria, Carniola, Upper Austria, Lower Austria, Bukovina, Galicia, Croatian Slavonia and finally Bosnia and Herzegovina) (Map 4.1),¹⁰ but also a result of

resource and commercial prospect. This repertoire was employed primarily by the domestic Bosnian political elites. A manifestation of nationhood with a discursive reference point in affinity, bonds as well as rights to nature (or, in our case, forests) certainly existed not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina but also in numerous other socioecological contexts throughout the late Habsburg Empire. Nevertheless, this specific form of nationalism has been left unproblemated. This research lacuna persists in the otherwise very extensive scholarship on nationalisms in the Habsburg imperial space, whose focus has been on linguistic, cultural and religious assertions to nationhood.

This chapter zooms in on conflicts in postannexation Bosnia and Herzegovina (from 1908 onwards) over access to Bosnia's natural environment as a commercial resource. It aims at establishing connections between nationalism, ecology and social conflicts.¹¹ I argue that these conflicts, while having a deep history, were fought out by new political means, based on new narratives and via new channels of influence during the late Habsburg period, which reflected not only political change in the wake of Bosnia's annexation but also a major socioeconomic transformation of Bosnia's people as well as their relationship with nature. The mediation of nationalism via reference to nature bore several specificities compared to other manifestations of nationhood in Bosnia at that time. The religiously and culturally informed nationalisms were not only inspired by and intertwined with the nationalist movements in neighbouring Serbia and Croatia, but also reflected geographical orientation towards the Croatian and Serbian political centres, which on their side aspired towards territorial appropriation of Bosnia.¹² The very localized nature of forests made this form of nationalism much more spatially bound to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I argue that the specific place-based nature of ecological nationalisms, entangled with the specifically Bosnian forests, offered the potential of fostering identities that were discursively grounded in Bosnian territory. As they were expressed in terms of securing access to state-owned forests by domestic capitalist enterprises, ecological nationalisms represented a struggle over political sovereignty by means of economic self-determination explicitly tied to the region of Bosnia through its forests.

The Habsburg Empire as a (Fragmented) Timber Empire

Forest extraction and timber export in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries represented the most important resource and trade component of Austria-Hungary as a continental European Empire and of Bosnia as one its last territorial acquisitions. From the 1880s onwards Austria-Hungary's forestry advanced, making it one of the top four leading European timber exporters.¹³ It is no coincidence that Austria-Hungary's rise to a timber giant

converged temporally with its occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Timber became a central intertwining element linking the Habsburg Empire and Bosnia in political, economic and ecological ways.

As a multiple-empire space on Europe's political margins, Bosnia's people and natural environment were successively governed by two imperial polities, the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires. The Ottoman Empire's historical presence dated back to 1463, which marked the beginning of its four-century-long imperial governance on European soil. In 1878, following the Congress of Berlin, Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia, representing the Monarchy's last territorial acquisition before its dissolution in 1918. Legally, however, Bosnia remained under Ottoman sovereignty until 1908, when it was annexed by Austria-Hungary.

As Selçuk Dursun shows in his contribution to this anthology, Habsburg eyes had been on Bosnia's forests as natural resources even before 1878. From the 1840s onwards, Habsburg merchants started to engage in small-scale extractions of Bosnian timber (mostly oak). With the occupation, however, these early economic activities increasingly became part of Habsburg's imperial timber commerce. Its economic activities were based on a revised legal framework, propelled by a hitherto-unexperienced industrial scale and operating within new economic structures that opened up global market spheres for Bosnia's timber.

By the time Bosnia was occupied, Austria-Hungary had grown into a giant on the European timber market, propelled by expanding extractivist activities.¹⁴ In 1900, Cisleithania's total forest area amounted to 9.8 million hectares, consisting predominantly of conifers.¹⁵ This abundance of conifers set the pace for Cisleithanian timber commerce, which mostly was oriented towards softwood exports. The forest composition in the Transleithanian half, on the other hand, whose 9.02 million hectares made up 28% of its territory, was dominated by deciduous forests.¹⁶ Of chief importance here was the oak forest wealth in Croatian Slavonia. As Skenderović's chapter shows, with the ongoing demilitarization of the Military Border in the 1860s, these forests became reframed as a natural resource for commerce-based extraction.¹⁷ These capitalist orientations created a window of opportunity for Transleithanian cask wood, which became one of the region's most prominent commodities on the global timber market.¹⁸ Finally, Bosnia's forests covered more than half of its territory, amounting to 2,549,716 hectares, out of which 61.8% were composed of high forests, 22.1% coppices and 16.1% scrublands.¹⁹ The higher altitudes boasted coniferous forests, with a mixed forest zone in the mid-altitudes and broadleaved forests in the lowlands.²⁰

The ecology of the Empire (understood here in terms of forest cover and forest composition) is, as I argue, of crucial importance for understanding the different timings and places of conflicts over Bosnian timber exports in the

period between 1886 and 1914. In terms of the opposing parties and interest groups, on the other hand, the conflict constellations were shaped by inter alia the property structures of forests. At a pan-imperial level, the legal structures of ownership and access varied drastically. In Cisleithania, forest lands were predominantly owned by private individuals: 60% of the forests were categorized as private. The imperial state, on the other hand, was the second smallest owner, with a share amounting to only 9.8% of Cisleithania's forests.²¹ In Transleithania, meanwhile, only 33.9% of forests were private, whereas state forests comprised 15.7% of the total forest lands.²² Bosnia and Herzegovina's property structures stood in sharp contrast to both of the imperial halves. Here, 76.3% of Bosnian forest lands were state-owned, whereas 23.7% were privately owned. The waqfs, the Muslim pious foundations, owned 3.2% of the total forest area.²³ It is important to note that these property structures were the result of years of legal negotiation and consolidation tightly entangled with the establishment of a land registry in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1884–1901).²⁴ Nevertheless, as I argue, this ownership structure set the pace for large-scale industrial extraction in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This stood in contrast to the small-scale timber production that was more typical of the imperial core lands, in which forests were often owned by private individuals. In other words, the variations in the property structure of forests throughout the Habsburg Empire had important implications for the Empire's economic life, ultimately shaping imperial economic policy.

Apart from the legal arena, Bosnia and Herzegovina's 'peculiarity' within the Habsburg imperial order also extended to its political status, administrative practices and the economic policy of the Empire, which earlier works often subsume under the descriptor 'colony' or 'proxy colony', signalling Bosnia's subordinate status in the Empire.²⁵ As an occupied region, Bosnia was administered by Austria-Hungary's Joint Ministry of Finance, which (together with the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of War) was the only ministry left after the 1867 *Ausgleich* to integrate and govern both of Habsburg's imperial halves. In contrast to the respective crownlands, Bosnia became a region in which Austrian and Hungarian imperial interests met, often collided and sometimes agreed.²⁶ In economic terms, no costs generated in the new province were to fall on the imperial treasury, which was why Bosnia and Herzegovina was to remain self-sustaining. As a consequence of this economic policy, the transition from Ottoman to Habsburg imperial governance was especially hard on Bosnia's forests. At the same time, Habsburg's transformative visions of Bosnia's natural environment made an important material dimension of the often-cited Habsburg 'civilizing mission' on European soil. State-managed, commerce-based, export-oriented forest extraction was meant not only to secure much-needed state revenues for the Austro-Hungarian Provincial Government in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also to bring social and economic benefits from

modern innovations, technical progress and advances in transport and infrastructure. However, in order to fully grasp Austria-Hungary's approach to Bosnian forests and the Empire's political economy, we need to go beyond the regional economic needs and include a pan-imperial perspective. I argue that these economically and politically motivated processes of making Bosnian forests available for large-scale industrial use converged with the rapid advancement of Austria-Hungary's forestry – and that the different property structures within the Empire drove different imperial political economic models in the respective regions, leading to intra-imperial tensions.²⁷

Apart from these legal differences, this study also proposes an environmental perspective as an important explanatory prism for understanding late Habsburg economic and political life. I argue that, based on the tree species, Bosnia's timber exports had different chronologies and different vectors of trade in terms of export destinations and consumption – environmentally informed differentials that shaped intra-imperial conflicts. These conflicts materialized in different ways, be it through political channels by employing political representatives, ministries as executive bodies, personal political networks, or by employing media for mobilization purposes, engaging (forestry) experts in the debate, or by employing nationalist rhetoric to redirect the utilization of Bosnia's forest lands by means of local capital.

In this chapter, I engage with three environmental case studies in order to gain a deeper understanding of late Habsburg governance:

- a) The intra-imperial conflict regarding Bosnian oak timber export in the 1880s
- b) The intra-imperial conflict regarding the export of Bosnian conifers in 1903–1905
- c) The political attacks by Bosnian local elites in the Bosnian *Landtag* against the foreign capitalist enterprises with regard to timber and capital flow in the 1910s.

Case Study 1: Bosnian Oak Exports ca. 1880–1890

The timber trade in Habsburg Bosnia, which generated state revenue for the Monarchy, began with oak timber extraction. Prior to the occupation, however, Ottoman Bosnia had already engaged in commerce-based and export-oriented oak trade on transimperial dimensions. Starting in the 1830s, old-growth oak trees in Bosnia were commodified for the purpose of the production of barrel staves for the flourishing French wine industry.²⁸ This not only led to Bosnia's integration into the European timber market, but also gave the region a special reputation abroad. In both France and England, Bosnian oak soon received

Table 4.1. Number of exported barrel staves from Bosnia and Herzegovina (1870–1887). Source: ABiH, ZMF, 1886/5636, Denkschrift betreff Verwerthung der überalten und schlagbaren Eichenbestände in Bosnien, Beilage 5, Faßdaubenstatistik der Jahre 1859 bis 1889. Table created by Iva Lučić.

Year	Number exported
1870	21,019
1871	31,991
1872	44,140
1873	32,068
1874	46,980
1875	56,159
1876	39,616
1877	36,166
1878	34,239
1879	32,238
1880	43,910
1881	34,109
1882	35,787
1883	51,254
1884	46,597
1885	50,543
1886	35,652
1887	51,608

the status of a distinguished brand, the *merrains de Bosnie*, or ‘Bosnian staves’. The strong pliability of Bosnian oak made it especially suitable for the production of barrel staves.²⁹

The Habsburg occupation in 1878, although an important political shift in the region, did not have any major impact on the dynamics and extent of timber extraction and trade at that time (see Table 4.1).³⁰ The initial focus on the oak trade was shaped by ecological, geographical and economic factors. At the time, Bosnia, alongside Croatian Slavonia, was one of the few remaining regions in Europe that still boasted substantial well-preserved old-growth broadleaved forests. In 1890, 57.7% of the state-managed forests (or 739,814 hectares) consisted of either oak high forests or mixed high forests of deciduous and conifer trees, mostly concentrated in the districts of Banja Luka and Donja Tuzla.³¹ Their geographical location in the lower lands and close to the Sava River made their extraction and transport possible even without major railway infrastructures. This opened an important window of opportunity for the early Habsburg administration to draw on the integration of the region in the global timber market as arranged during the late Ottoman period, and generate state revenues without state capital investments. In terms of trade routes, modes of timber sales, clientele and extractive regions, the initial years

of the Habsburg occupation were marked by strong continuity from the late Ottoman period. Sales through public auctions continued, in which local merchants participated alongside merchants from the Monarchy (primarily from Croatian Slavonia but also Vienna and Lower Austria).³² From 1882 onwards, however, the auctions became complemented by and soon completely replaced by contracts based on free settlement agreements between the *Landesregierung* and the enterprises or private persons. The first contract, dating from 1882, was with the Viennese firm Johann Brabetz. The most important client, however, was and remained the Italian firm Morpurgo and Parente, which had acquired Bosnian oak since the late Ottoman period, and which was the major exploiter of Bosnian oak forests by means of contract-based sales from 1886 onwards.³³

At the same time, the occupation meant also locating the region within a new economic context as it became part of the political economy and market orientations of the Habsburg Empire. One expression of this new landscape was the expansion of export destinations and consumer countries. Apart from traditional consumers such as France, Algeria and England, the Italian and Spanish markets became new consumers of Bosnian barrel staves from 1880 onwards, even though they never came close to France's consumption rates.³⁴ The occupation also reframed the contours of Bosnia's economic life as it introduced a new political and economic relationship with Croatian Slavonia, which from a European perspective was the other major region known for its old-growth oak forests. Until then, Croatian Slavonia had been the traditional oak barrel stave provider of Habsburg provenance.³⁵ Initially, this relationship was marked by an ecological and economic attraction: Slavonian timber merchants were attracted to Bosnia's richness as a reservoir of good quality timber promising significant capital profits based on low sales prices.³⁶ The year 1886, however, marked an important, if short-term, situational shift in the economic and ecological relationship between Bosnia's and Slavonia's oak trade, when Bosnia transformed from a potential ecological reservoir into an internal economic threat.

The year of 1886 was marked by several internal as well as external turbulences that soon led to a worsening of the market situation. Externally, the demand for oak timber and barrel staves fell drastically, as France and also Algeria (from 1885 on) suffered major damage from the insect *Phylloxera vastatrix*, which destroyed thousands of hectares of vineyards.³⁷ In contrast to the year 1885, during which 50,542,636 pieces of barrel staves were sold, in 1886 only 35,651,599 pieces were sold – a drop of 30%.³⁸ At the same time, and rather paradoxically given this worsening sales situation, several large-scale oak forest sales between private actors and imperial state bodies were being completed. In Bosnia, the Provincial Government signed a deal with the Italian company Morpurgo and Parente, introducing an industrial nature to Bosnian oak timber extraction on a hitherto unprecedented scale.³⁹ It was this

combination of environmentally determined external market factors and economic activities in the oak trade in the Habsburg Empire that threatened now to shift the economic fortunes of the traditional Sisseker oak timber merchants and barrel stave producers, becoming a trigger for political action in 1886.

On 1 April 1886, three major wood-processing companies in Sissek (the Blasich, Hirsch and Morovich companies) handed over a memorandum to the Ban of the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia, Count Károly Khuen-Héderváry, in which they complained about the growing overproduction of barrel staves that, they feared, would outpace international demand by a factor of two. According to the companies, this overproduction was due to several sales of oak trees that took place in late 1885. It is important to note that, apart from Bosnia, they listed several other internal competitors, such as major land-owning families in Slavonia, as well as the Investment Fund of the Croatian-Slavonian Military Border and the Provincial Government in Croatian Slavonia, all of whom were engaging in oak timber sales that threatened to overrun the market and drive the petitioning Croatian Slavonian timber merchants out of their traditional markets.

In their petition, the three companies demanded that the Ban lobby for an intervention to set immediate limits on oak tree sales by private and state actors – sales that otherwise, the petitioners argued, threatened to depress the price of barrel staves on the market.⁴⁰ The initiative aimed to use political representatives as a buffer to protect their own economic interests from pressures and perceived crises caused by industrial capitalism, itself fuelled by both international and domestic capital – a situation that had led not only to competition on the international market but also to a heightened sense of intra-imperial economic competition. The petitioners' move was informed by an economic ideology that prioritized state interventionism over the individual, capitalist free market for regulating the movement of goods across imperial boundaries.⁴¹ While this ideology was applied primarily to foreign trade, the petitioners demanded that interventions be imposed on their internal competitors. Even though Héderváry promised to 'dedicate more attention to this question in order to bring the interests of the timber trade into harmony with the interests of the region [Croatian-Slavonia]', his attempts to intervene with the Minister of Finance proved fruitless.⁴²

Consequently, Bosnian oak exports continued to expand and, in retrospect, the year 1886 was seen as an important turning point in which the oak trade experienced an economic boost followed by continuing export rises, at least until the early twentieth century.⁴³ In 1890, forest surveys revealed that 45,000 hectares out of the 69,000 hectares of state-managed old-growth oak forests were already either exploited or sold. The remaining 24,000 hectares became the subject of reckless industrial extractivism in the years to come.⁴⁴ Most importantly, this key moment in the reconfiguration of Bosnia's timber market

was shaped not politically but ecologically. It was the increasing exhaustion of the oak forests that eventually made oak exports shrink to one of the smallest branches of the Bosnian timber trade – to such an extent that, on 3 February 1904, the Austrian delegation noted that ‘there are no more oak trees in Bosnia and Herzegovina’.⁴⁵ The last major extraction of oak trees in Bosnia occurred in 1913.⁴⁶

At this point, it is legitimate to ask about the reasons for the limited reach and capacity of the Croatian Ban and the Slavonian merchants to exercise influence on Bosnia’s timber trade. We need to understand this in the context of both the economic policy of the Empire (mostly the Ministry of Finance) towards Bosnia and Herzegovina and the rather loose political coordination of the 1886 Croatian initiative.

In organizational terms, the political move was based on the alignment of only three merchants, albeit central figures in the barrel stave production market. Signing the petition together, however, in no way meant unity in economic or organizational terms. The merchants did not follow up on their effort to intervene in the imperial political economy via political lobbying; the petition remained a singular event. Also, the initiative received very limited attention in the public arena. The media reported on the initiative two weeks after the petition was filed, but without follow-up.⁴⁷ One reason for this was that the market soon showed signs of recovery: in 1887, the export of barrel staves not only recovered but also exceeded the rates of 1885.⁴⁸ This circumstance led the complaining merchants to return to Bosnian oak forests as a (cheap) resource rather than continuing to perceive the region as an economic competitor. As for the economic policy of the Habsburg central government, the Joint Ministry of Finance continued a policy of capitalist extractivism and free trade that did not necessarily coincide with the region’s economic interests, while at the same time colliding with the economic interests of other parts of the Empire.

However, despite the failed attempt of 1886, Bosnia’s ever-increasing oak trade remained a politically divisive subject, which every now and then would be placed on the agenda of the delegations in Vienna. One of the major accusations made against the Joint Ministry of Finance was that, even after several decades of Habsburg governance, Bosnia’s ecological richness was not used to benefit the region nor did it contribute to its economic development.⁴⁹ Special attention was given to the extremely low prices at which the ministry sold Bosnian standing timber. The Austro-Hungarian minister of finance, Benjamin von Kállay, on the other hand, was an experienced politician. In response to criticisms of chronic undervaluation of Bosnia’s timber, his counterargument was borrowed from the language of forestry science: he argued that Bosnia’s old-growth forests and old trees were in acute need of felling for the purpose of forest regeneration.⁵⁰ It was better, he asserted, to

Table 4.2. Number of oak trunks sold in 1890. Source: ABiH, ZMF 1890/5636, Ausweis über die Nutzungsfläche, welche die Durchführung der Eichenstämmenverkäufe banspricht und jene Eichenwaldfläche, welche als ungenutzt erübrigt. Table created by Iva Lučić.

Firm	Number of oak trunks
Morpurgo & Parente	906,328
K. Schlesinger	94,822
J. Brabetz	45,000
L. Blasich	882
Gl. Jeftanović	332
M. Verosta	203

sell the old oak logs at a fraction of the established market price than to let the old-growth forests rot.⁵¹

In relation to Bosnia's timber-trade activity under Habsburg rule, the 1886 initiative marked the first time that it was perceived as potentially posing an economic threat to another region within the Empire. This was also the first of many episodes in which timber as a natural resource functioned as a disintegrative force within the Empire.

Case Study 2: The Bosnian Danger, 1903–1905

Seven years after the first pushback against Bosnian oak exports, a second attempt to marginalize or even disqualify the Bosnian timber trade from Habsburg's economic life was set in motion – this time much more dramatic and long-lasting. By that time, Bosnia's economic activities had undergone several structural changes. From the late 1890s onwards, the Bosnian timber trade experienced its most important reorientation: oak timber was replaced and outpaced by the extraction of the vast areas of coniferous forests that until then had been mostly inaccessible. The process of transforming remote mountain forests into economically productive resources was shaped by two interrelated factors. The first factor was an influx of foreign private capital from experienced wood-processing enterprises, who started to invest as they established large-scale industrial use of Bosnia's rich forest terrains. To this end, between 1890 and 1905 the Provincial Government in Sarajevo signed approximately forty long-term contracts with duration periods of between ten and thirty years with around twenty private enterprises. Most of them, although not all, were of foreign origin.⁵² The two largest and most important companies were the *Bosnische Forstindustrie a.d. Aktiengesellschaft Otto Steinbeis* (which from 1892 onwards signed contracts to acquire vast forest

areas in northwestern Bosnia between Drvar, Jajce, Dobrljn and Grmeć) and the *Eissler & Ortlieb* consortium of the Munich-based timber company Louis Ortlieb and the Vienna-based timber magnate Richard Eissler (which in 1899 signed a major contract to exploit pine forests in the Krivaja valley). These two companies amounted to 68% of all the contracts to exploit Bosnia's forests.⁵³

In pursuit of their commercial objectives, these companies took particular advantage not only of the region's ecological richness, but also of the state-led incentives offered by the Ministry of Finance. Given the lack of state capital investments, Kállay's priority was to open up space for private businesses to emerge as the most important economic users of Bosnia's forests as natural resources. This came at a price, as the companies demanded significant favourable concessions. One of the most important state-granted incentives was the comparatively low, fixed-rate timber prices for the duration of the contracts. After all, these private capitalists were looking not only for vast forests, but above all for cheap timber. Further concessions were granted through favourable profit tax rates, which, in contrast to the 10% common in the Habsburg Empire, were only 3% in Bosnia.⁵⁴

In pursuit of capital accumulation, these companies established their presence in the region and became a feature of everyday life in Bosnia. They were involved in the construction of transport routes, railways and urban infrastructure, and they supplied the most advanced technological equipment for wood-processing available in Europe, which amazed and attracted visitors from as far abroad as Japan, Germany and France. Timber merchants, forestry students and botanical scholars alike travelled to the region on study trips.⁵⁵ *Eissler & Ortlieb*, meanwhile, became known as the most modern forestry enterprise in the whole of Europe, boasting a storage house for sawn timber in excess of thirty-five hectares and a factory with 2,400, 1,200, 200 and 80 horsepower steam engines. The sawmill and its equipment – including twenty-one full gates, four slit holes and several batten saws and circular saws with the capacity to cut up to 430,000 cubic metres annually – were another major attraction for industrial and scientific agents from all over the world.⁵⁶

The second major factor leading to the important recalibration in Bosnian timber exports was the advancement of railway infrastructure during the 1890s, which made the coniferous forests in remote mountainous areas viable for large-scale extraction and export. In particular, the state's Sarajevo-Metković line, completed in 1891, connected Bosnia to the Adriatic Sea. At the same time, the private companies were also building infrastructure for timber transport. No one rose further than Otto Steinbeis, who by the turn of the twentieth century exported timber on a scale of seven to eight thousand wagons of sawn softwood per year, and who initiated major infrastructure projects such as the 338-kilometre-long narrow-gauge forestry railway (the Steinbeis-Railway) connecting the Una Valley to the Dalmatian town of Knin,

itself linked to the ports of Šibenik and Split.⁵⁷ From the perspective of the Habsburg imperial centre, forestry served not only as an arena to illustrate successful governance in the region, but also to enhance the image of a major successful timber empire ascendant on the international market.

Finally, the arrival of private wood-processing companies also provided a tremendous boost to the consolidation of export-oriented forest commerce with a focus on coniferous softwood. Most of Bosnia's timber exports were oriented towards the Mediterranean markets, a region that had traditionally been an important market for Habsburg's Alpine regions and the crownlands of Styria, Carinthia and Carniola. Bosnian timber soon gained in popularity among timber merchants and consumers in the Mediterranean as it was not only of comparatively good quality but, more importantly, sold at the fraction of the price of timber coming from the central crownlands to the ports of Trieste and Fiume.⁵⁸ This price differential reflected the fact that Bosnian timber companies faced substantially lower production costs, the result of Habsburg imperial subsidies in the Bosnian region. The new circumstances soon resulted in a situation in which the southern Alpine lands, seeing Bosnia as a new competitor, feared that their economic importance was about to fade. Unlike oak timber exports, which relied on old commercial practices from the previous political regimes, in the case of the sawn softwood exports, Bosnia was a newcomer on the market. Against this background, the growing Bosnian timber exports to the Mediterranean became the catalyst of a furious debate between 1903 and 1905, which made headlines in the media across the Empire under the heading of 'The Bosnian Danger'.

At the heart of the debate was the attempt of the Alpine regions to create a political movement within the Cisleithanian imperial half in order to protect their economic interests by reducing Bosnian exports of sawn softwood to the Mediterranean market. Bosnia's particular political and administrative status within the Empire – being administered by the Joint Ministry of Finance – made the conflict constellation rather precarious. It did not represent a regular horizontal competition between different regions within the Empire, but had the shape of a vertical conflict between, on one hand, some of the Habsburg crownlands and, on the other hand, the central imperial political body (Joint Ministry of Finance) as the major responsible body for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In contrast to the 1886 episode, the actors involved in the debates of 1903–1905 comprised a large spectrum of agents including politically active industrialists in Cisleithania and politicians as well as forestry experts. The last became a major mouthpiece for the timber industrialists, promoting their political and economic goals. The prelude to the long-lasting conflict about Bosnian timber exports was framed by Leopold Hufnagl, one of the leading experts on forest utilization and timber trade of that time. On 6 March 1903, Hufnagl's

article entitled ‘The Bosnian Danger’ made headlines in the leading Habsburg journal on forestry, *Österreichische Forst- und Jagdzeitung* (*Austrian Forestry and Hunting Newspaper*), and also set the tone for the polemics to follow. As he argued, Bosnian large-scale timber extraction and exports were having a ruinous effect on the economy of the southern Alpine lands, which were experiencing export reductions of up to 20%.⁵⁹ His criticisms addressed not only imperial policy-making in Bosnia but also the competition between domestic and foreign capital on the global timber market. Thus, Hufnagl directed accusations against the Joint Ministry of Finance, whose favourable concessions granted to foreign wood-processing enterprises resulted in speculative timber extraction with devastating economic effects on Habsburg timber production areas. He requested immediate political action including better transparency of the foreign contracts, a recalibration of Bosnian timber sales from long-term contracts to public auctions and finally the regulation of Bosnian timber exports via major flow restrictions towards the Mediterranean.⁶⁰ According to Hufnagl, ‘[t]he issue of Bosnian timber export was an eminent Austrian issue’; he refused to see Bosnia’s timber export as part of the Habsburg export constellation but rather placed it in opposition to the rest of the imperial lands.⁶¹

Hufnagl’s article became the trigger for long-lasting intra-imperial economic friction. It also set the tone for an infuriated public debate in which not everyone shared Hufnagl’s views regarding the economic danger to the Monarchy represented by Bosnian timber exports. It was none other than the major timber exporter Otto Steinbeis himself who offered a counternarrative in which he, on one hand, downplayed Bosnia’s effect on Habsburg timber exports to Italy while at the same time blamed the Alpine regions for their obsolete and expensive exploitation techniques.⁶² As for the low timber prices, he legitimized them by pointing to the lack of transportation infrastructure in the region, which forced the enterprises to make significant investments – which were then traded off against lower prices.⁶³ Still, it was the attacking voices that dominated the public and political spaces.

The timing of the debate – the year 1903 – was not without significance, since it followed the completion of the forestry railways operated by Steinbeis and Eissler & Ortlieb, promising a major rise in Bosnian timber exports.⁶⁴ At the same time, the Hungarian government was trying to redirect Bosnian timber exports via its port of Fiume by offering reduced transportation tariffs. Consequently, the transportation costs of Bosnian timber to the Italian market were considerably below those of the Alpine timber producers (298 lire versus 342 lire).⁶⁵ Thus, the debate reflected the anxieties of the Cisleithanian imperial provinces about continued economic harm to Austrian forestry.

Whereas economic concerns and the question of each region’s share within the Habsburg timber export landscape lay at the heart of the conflict, the ‘Bosnian Danger’ soon also gained ecological dimensions. When the delega-

tion met in Vienna in February 1904 for one of several sessions discussing the Bosnian Danger, the Dalmatia-born Juraj Binakini referred to Bosnian timber exports as not only an economic danger to the Monarchy's forestry industry but also an ecological danger with devastating effects on Bosnia's ecological richness. 'In 40 or 50 years,' he argued, 'Bosnia will become a totally deforested land if no sustainable precautions are taken'.⁶⁶ Political opponents of the prevailing forestry policy in Bosnia also pointed to ecological concerns. According to them, the only possible solution for sustainable forest management was to switch to state-managed forest enterprises, which was supposed to go hand in hand with reduced timber exports. Thus, the ecological framing of sustainable forest extraction functioned as a mimicry strategy for advancing the economic interests of the affected regions.

The media debates had a strong mobilizing function and spilled over to other political and public arenas such as the meetings of the delegations, forestry entrepreneur interest groups (*Österreichischer Reichsforstverein* [Austrian Imperial Forestry Association], *Kärntnerischer Forstverein* [Carinthian Forestry Association]) and forestry congresses. At the same time, they also became the major catalyst for new alignments and public initiatives, during which the forestry entrepreneurs of Cisleithania formed bottom-up cooperations. So it was at the meeting in Klagenfurt on 19 December 1903, when alpine forest owners and timber merchants came together to take joint action against Bosnian timber exports, which were now officially declared 'a heavy damage to the timber trade of the whole Habsburg Monarchy, especially the Alpine lands'.⁶⁷ The affected interest groups rhetorically transposed their economic setbacks and interests on a pan-imperial level, framing them as an issue that affected the whole Habsburg Empire. The political closing of ranks was articulated in the form of a joint memorandum assuring 'joint, swift, and energetic resistance' to 'joint dangers', emphasizing that, 'despite the spatial dispersion across different parts of the empire', they were to come together on the basis of joint interests.⁶⁸

This was an expression of attempted political integrationism on a transregional level among the economically affected regions, which nevertheless were all within the Cisleithanian imperial half. It was carried out by private actors: the politically engaged industrialists. There were no economic and political solidarity acts or integrationist attempts with the Transleithanian half despite the fact that, only a few years earlier, Croatian Slavonia had experienced a similar economic setback due to Bosnian oak timber exports. Instead, the shared experience of the Hungarian counterpart, which was now framed as an expression of political lethargy, was taken as a contrasting basis against which the Alpine lands aimed to show Cisleithania's political decisiveness. More importantly, these integrationist attempts among the southern Alpine regions were serving disintegrational economic purposes aimed at Bosnia

as one of Habsburg's timber exporters. After all, it was precisely the Alpine lands' need for political action and state-led market intervention in order to reduce, if not halt, Bosnian timber exports in pursuit of their own economic interests that occupied a central place in the political movement related to the 'Bosnian Danger'.

To be sure, Bosnia was by far not the only competitor that the small-scale entrepreneurs faced, as heightened competition was coming also from Galicia, Bukowina, Russia and the United States. However, Bosnia had become symbolic of industrial, commerce-based timber trade. The very fact that Bosnia was portrayed as the quintessential foreign rival reflected the political attitude of the crownlands towards Bosnia's economic and political status within the Habsburg Empire, where they followed the classical imperial political economy according to which the economic activities of a colony were supposed to complement instead of contest their own economic activities. With regard to themselves, they painted a picture of being the traditional timber provider with a long history in the Mediterranean region. In other words, the debate reflected the question of what constituted legitimate commerce by the Habsburg Empire. This approach was all the clearer when compared to the positioning towards Bukovina and Galicia, who were also fierce competitors, but whose economic activities were never questioned and whose right to exist as part of Habsburg's timber export constellation went unchallenged.

In terms of political action, despite the domination of the integrationist attempts, there was at the same time political agency by single crownlands, most notably Carinthia and Carniola, one of the most affected regions.⁶⁹ At the 1904 meeting of the Carniolian Coastland Foresters' Society (*Krainisch Küstenländischer Forstverein*), the supreme forestry administrator Kornelius Rieder brought a new, moral dimension to the political struggle to marginalize Bosnian timber exports in his report on the Bosnian rival (*Bosnische Konkurrenz*). He accused Bosnia of trying to exclude Carinthian timber products from the Italian market not only by means of knockdown prices but also through business fraud. According to him, some of the most prominent exporters (such as Eissler & Ortlieb) were mislabelling Bosnian products on the Italian market with the brand 'Carinthia superiore', because, as he argued, 'Italian timber merchants always prefer Carinthian timber because of its high quality'.⁷⁰ Through this vilification of Bosnian activities and attempted revaluation of Carinthian timber quality, the society aimed to attract Habsburg political action towards protective initiatives against Bosnian trade. The provincial government in Sarajevo initiated an investigation of the claims, but they were never proved.⁷¹

As the Bosnian Danger debate progressed, it invoked ethics, tradition and history of the Habsburg crownlands, ecological sustainability, and Bosnia as an economic danger, all in order to justify the importance of the Alpine

regions' economic interests and legitimate the demand for political intervention. These multiple strategies reflected the difficulties faced by the representatives of the Alpine regions to mobilize sympathetic political action within the imperial apparatus. At the same time, and despite these challenges, the Bosnian Danger became a central issue at the imperial level. While it began as an economic issue, it soon merged with other political agendas as interest groups recognized the debate as an opportunity to articulate their own concerns. This was the case with deputy Schönerer in 1903. Known for his strong antisemitic sentiments and anti-Slavic policies, Schönerer utilized the Bosnian Danger debate for his own political agenda; that is, to counter the prospect of the political annexation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary. Similarly to the Alpine regions, he deployed a language of exclusion and otherness to separate Bosnia and Herzegovina from the imagined imperial space, but this time in constitutional terms.

Finally, what political effects did the Bosnian Danger campaign have? Unlike the episode in 1886, it succeeded in setting in motion political action by the newly appointed Joint Minister of Finance, Count Stephan Burián von Rajecz, who in 1903 replaced the deceased Kállay. Unlike Kállay, Burián appeared to be unprepared for the numerous frictions, and tried to find a balancing act that would satisfy the industrialists in the Monarchy without endangering the capitalists in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1905 he announced the end of long-term contracts. The existing contracts with the established companies, however, he refused to cancel.⁷² The economic effects hoped for by the Alpine regions did not materialize. Bosnia's timber exports continued to rise. This offers an important corrective to the literature, which has argued that the economic relations between Habsburg and Bosnia were of a colonialist type as there was no free trade.⁷³ The case of timber exports shows that no state restrictions were imposed on trade in Bosnia. The steering mechanism in this policy was the homogenising logic of the global capitalist market as well as the desire of the Habsburg Empire to position and secure its place as a major timber exporter on the global market.

Moment 3: Ecological Nationalism

Burián's decision to end long-term contracts and introduce instead a model of public auction sales did not have a major effect on the foreign enterprises operating in Bosnia, but it did affect domestic enterprises in the region. A rising social strata of entrepreneurs from Bosnia and Herzegovina was becoming vocal in its attempts to become an integral part of the extractivist activities in Bosnian forests. Thus, the early years of the twentieth century saw rising demands by the Bosnian economic elite to secure access to Bosnian

state-managed forests. In 1907, the Muslim family enterprise Šabanović, whose sawmill was located in Pale near Sarajevo, petitioned the Minister of Finance Burián, asking for the low tax rate from 1900 to be maintained and asking to acquire forest lands at a lower price. They legitimized their request by referring to themselves as an old traditional domestic enterprise of ethical businesses trying to survive against foreign competitors.⁷⁴ The same year, 1907, another group of well-off Serbian merchants from Mostar, led by Vojislav Šola, asked the Ministry of Finance for access to forest complexes in Konjic and Nevesinje – rights they described as a ‘benevolent act towards the domestic sons.’⁷⁵ As such petitions started to accumulate, they illustrated a transformed human–nature relationship among the local Bosnian population, which increasingly viewed forests as an economic resource. At the same time, they signalled how Burián’s 1905 decision intensified the feeling among domestic entrepreneurs that their economic interests were being neglected, which became a major catalyst for a more organized political movement, this time originating within Bosnia and Herzegovina itself.

Five years after the Bosnian Danger episode calmed down, in 1910, Bosnian forests and their management again made headlines in the imperial media. In the meantime, Bosnia’s political status within the Habsburg Empire had changed. In 1908, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, leading to formal territorial acquisition and integration into the Habsburg imperial state. Nevertheless, Bosnia never enjoyed an equal status with the crown-lands. The Bosnian Diet never became an autonomous political body and the nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina were denied the right to participate in imperial-level political decisions.⁷⁶ Despite the fact that the Bosnian Diet remained subject to the control of the Imperial and Royal Ministry of Finance, the region’s new political status brought Bosnian forest management to the central stage of political attention both in Bosnia and on the imperial level.⁷⁷

As for the media, unlike the Bosnian Danger episode, Austrian newspapers provided highly attentive reporting on the political actions of the Bosnian *Landtag*. After all, from the perspective of the Austrian Alpine regions, which even after 1905 remained severely affected by Bosnia’s presence on the Mediterranean timber market, ‘the Austrian-Hungarian foresters had a legitimate interest to know in what way the owner of the major forest complexes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the region itself, will position itself towards the hitherto management of the forest lands and what future directives the new administration will give in this regard.’⁷⁸ This position reflected a political situation in which both the Cisleithanian Alpine regions and the Bosnian *Landtag* shared political hopes that the latter would eventually gain control over Bosnia’s state-forest lands, which would mark a new era in Bosnian forest management and timber export.

Nevertheless, none of these interest groups pursued political cooperation as did the Alpine regions during the Bosnian Danger episode. Firstly, the Bosnian Diet was politically unequal to the crownlands. Secondly, despite their shared transformative visions about Bosnian forest management, the Bosnian Diet pursued an economic policy that was diametrically different from that of the Alpine regions. Unlike the Alpine regions' desire for ecologically sustainable forest extraction, the Bosnian Diet advocated extractivism, capitalist profit accumulation and timber export, all to be undertaken by domestic enterprises. The political actions of the Bosnian Diet were informed by the competition between foreign and domestic capital: the Diet functioned as a major mouth-piece for domestic entrepreneurs, who aspired to operate under the same concessional privileges as their foreign competitors. These political aspirations had important effects on the political strategy of the Bosnian Diet. Unlike the previous episodes, where political actions were directed inwards (i.e., towards the Ministry of Finance), the Bosnian Diet directed its attacks primarily towards foreign capitalist enterprises. Thus, at its very first session in 1910, when its agenda included the question of forest management and extraction, the Diet formed a control committee to examine the foreign companies' execution of the contracts. That the Ministry of Finance was spared from any severe attacks reflected the specific power constellation in which the Bosnian Diet remained under control of the Ministry of Finance, on whose benevolence the domestic entrepreneurs were highly dependent in their claims for securing access to state-managed forests.

The fact that the Bosnian Diet's primary goal was to secure access to state forests for extraction purposes by domestic enterprises also informed its political strategies. Unlike during the Bosnian Danger episode, the Diet expressed views that can be characterized as ecological nationalism. Even in the context of a general trend towards nationalization on the Habsburg political scene, the manifestation of ecological nationalism in the Bosnian sphere had very distinctive features.⁷⁹ Appeals such as 'forests to our domestic sons' or descriptions of the forests as 'ours' implied the evocation of national sentiments towards Bosnia's natural environment. Importantly, unlike the usual religious and cultural manifestations of nationalism in Bosnia, which were divisive, Bosnian forests had an integrative dimension, making them a reference point for national aspirations. They were bound to the specific Bosnian space, thus endowing ecological nationalism with a territorial, pan-Bosnian dimension that went beyond any religious or cultural specificities. Further, the domestic entrepreneurs came from different confessional circles but pursued the same goal – gaining extraction rights in Bosnian forests – cementing the forests as a national reference point.

The years to follow were marked by an intensive media campaign against foreign private enterprises – a campaign that highlighted irregularities in the

companies' execution of long-term contracts, which had been uncovered by the control committee. In 1912 media reported on the 'devastating consequences of the contract [of the company Steinbeis]': the company did not sufficiently plant trees,⁸⁰ which led to the formation of karst regions vulnerable to land erosion by wind and storms.⁸¹ In economic terms, extremely low prices for standing timber, whose market price meanwhile had risen tenfold, enabled the company to accumulate major profits, leading to economic damages to Bosnia that amounted to several million crowns.⁸²

Whereas ecological nationalists were trying to secure an uncontested place for the domestic wood-processing enterprises, the media campaign was oriented towards delegitimizing the presence of foreign enterprises. As the numerous privileges that the foreign companies had been enjoying for all their years in Bosnia were revealed, the media portrayed them as not only an expression of political protectionism by the Ministry of Finance (especially as headed by Kállay), but also indicative of corruption within the highest ranks of the Joint Ministry of Finance. Even though these practices dated back to Kállay's time, the increasing pressure exerted by both the Bosnian Diet and the media disclosures increasingly undermined the ministry's political legitimacy. This ultimately led to the resignation of the Joint Minister of Finance, Burián, and two of his close associates engaged in Bosnian affairs, L. Thalloczy and E. Horovitz, as well as Petraschek, who was in charge of forestry in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁸³

Another major fallout occurred one year later, in 1913, when Otto Steinbeis sold his enterprise to the Habsburg government, making the Provincial Government in Sarajevo its new owner.⁸⁴ The sale implied the immediate cancellation of the contract that otherwise was supposed to last for another twenty-two years, as well as takeover by the Provincial Government, which was from then on in charge of the exploitation of the vast forest complexes – something the Austrian media reported on as a new era in Bosnian forestry.⁸⁵ Thus, unlike the two previous political interventions, whose effects were very limited, the outcome of the Bosnian Diet's political campaign was comparatively the strongest. However, given its timing, its results could not bear major fruit as in 1914 the First World War broke out, bringing a new political era not only for Bosnia but for the whole Habsburg Empire.

Conclusion

Following the major aim of this anthology, in this chapter I argue that by applying the thematic and analytical optics of environmental history to the late Habsburg Empire, we gain more nuanced understandings of the Habsburg imperial forms and structures of power and political arenas. The study can be

read as an advancement of the research frontiers in the debates on the integrative and disintegrative forces that coexisted and shaped the socioeconomic, political and environmental experiences of the late Habsburg Empire. By applying an environmental historical perspective with a focus on the most abundant natural resource in the Empire (timber), this chapter has illustrated the multidirectional and multilayered economic and ecological entanglements not only between the crownlands but also between Bosnia and the rest of the Habsburg Empire.

All three case studies illustrate that Austria-Hungary's occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina not only reshaped the region's political and economic life, but at the same time set new contours of political and economic activity in the imperial crownlands, with tangible effects on economic life throughout the whole Habsburg Empire. In the case of Bosnia, the occupation reframed the region's economic activities as it became located not only within the European and global timber markets, but also within the imperial economic space, putting it in a more direct political relationship and economic competition with other regions of the Habsburg Empire that had traditionally engaged in timber trade and export. From the perspective of the crownlands, the occupation (and later annexation) of Bosnia forced them to grapple with Bosnia's place within both the Habsburg imperial economic policy and the European timber market. Based on my findings, I argue that it is necessary to go beyond the narrative of Bosnia as an administrative and political exception within the constellation of Austria-Hungary, and to more actively integrate the region in the analysis of the economic and political life of the late Habsburg Empire. Bosnian case studies illustrate the transregional economic connectivities that emerged and operated in the late Habsburg Empire, showing how they often transcended the confines of the traditional imperial centres of power.

This chapter has shown how the perception of occupied Bosnia and its timber trade as a central threat to the Habsburg timber trade shaped the dynamics of integrative forces among the imperial crownlands in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Both Cisleithania and Transleithania were affected by Bosnian timber exports, but expressed very different qualities of a cooperative empire. Unlike Cisleithania, where transregional cooperation materialized very quickly (even if only among the economically affected regions), in the case of Transleithania, no such integrationist initiatives were ever brought up. Moreover, cooperation across the two imperial halves never emerged. These different outcomes can be seen as a result of the fact that each of the imperial halves was affected by Bosnian timber exports at a different time and by different trade logics. These qualitative differences of the conflict constellations were dependent on the specific tree species and their respective export destinations. Moreover, the chapter has illustrated a hitherto neglected logic of cooperative empire, namely, how imperial integration processes of

the economically affected crownlands emerged as a political and economic medium with disintegrative purposes towards another region within the Empire, i.e., Bosnia and Herzegovina. Consequently, I argue that these integrative forces were not systematic and all-encompassing within Cisleithania, but could emerge as selective political or economic forces that often were shaped according to perceived hierarchies within the Habsburg Empire.

As for ecological nationalism, it presupposes a radical change in human relations with the environment, which may imply changes in social and political life. In the case of Bosnia, as I have argued, the terrain was prepared by the rising commodification of timber among local economic elites, who in 1910 turned to the Bosnian Diet in their attempt to appropriate Bosnian forests. The Habsburg affirmation of its control over Bosnian forests evoked Bosnian national sentiments, making forests a space or reference point for national aspirations. Unlike earlier analyses of nationalisms that focus on cultural and linguistic performances, ecological nationalism offers a physical basis. In the case of Bosnia, ecological nationalism provides a lens through which we can understand the confluence between Bosnian territoriality and the interests of groups with different religious backgrounds in the context of securing extractivist rights to forests. At the same time, it is also possible to turn the ecological nationalism perspective on the transregional level by portraying the integrative efforts of the imperial core lands as an expression of an ecological nationalism operating under the attribute of a true 'Austrian issue'. In this way, the environmental history perspective allows us to reimagine the nation in the context of its social and territorial scope as well as its linguistic and cultural manifestations.

Moreover, the fact that the cooperating crownlands did not realize their goal of disconnecting Bosnia from the timber market invites us to (re)think Bosnia's status and the policy-making of the Habsburg Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It illustrates that the imperial political and economic policy towards Bosnia was not monolithic, but informed by a variety of different and often conflicting interests. Moreover, the crownlands' lack of success was not so much due to political or social forces within the Empire, but to the capitalist forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina – forces on which the Habsburg imperial administration was heavily dependent and, in some instances, even subordinate to. Through the prism of an economic and environmental perspective on the cooperative empire, we get also a better understanding of empire–capital relations as determining factors of late Habsburg imperial governance. It illustrates that Habsburg governance, not only in Bosnia, was shaped by a rather aggressively capitalist mood in which private capital played a prominent role and was sometimes even placed above the economic interests of the crownlands. The steering mechanism in this policy was the homogenising logic of the global capitalist market as well

as Austria-Hungary's urge to secure its place as a major timber exporter on the global market. Given the property structures in the crownlands, where forests were often owned by private people and the modes of production were marked by traditional family enterprises at a considerably lower capacity, the Empire was not able to establish such a high modernist model in its metropolises. Bosnia, on the other hand, offered an opportunity where vast forest lands were owned by the imperial state. The lack of state-directed capital, however, put the modernising and industrialising machinery in the region in the hands of private companies, who made use of state-sponsored opportunities such as concessions and the specific political economy in Bosnia (e.g., very low timberprices).

Finally, if we look at the geographic origins of the enterprises operating in Bosnia, we see a kaleidoscope of industrialists and investors whose capital was not necessarily tied to the Habsburg imperial centres and went far beyond the geography of the Empire. In fact, among the foreign enterprises, the most important actors came from other parts of Europe, including Bavaria (Steinbeis, Eissler & Ortlieb) and Italy (Morpurgo and Parente). Consequently, the capital profits based on large-scale extraction from Bosnia's forests were not directed towards the Habsburg imperial metropolises, but to the respective companies' centres located outside the Habsburg imperial space. In this sense, late Habsburg imperial governance was defined by the complex intersection and interdependence of political power exercised by the imperial bodies, on levels ranging from regional to pan-imperial, and private capital, which reached far beyond the Empire's geographical scope. It is the logic of these geographies that gives us the true nature of late Habsburg governance not only in Bosnia but more generally – a nature far more complex than a bidirectional metropole–colony or centre–periphery model.

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Notes

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1. Georg von Schönerer was one of the initiators of the pan-German movement and had a key role in political antisemitism in the Habsburg Empire.
2. Arhiv Bosne i Hercegovine (Archive of Bosnia and Herzegovina, hereafter ABiH), Zajedničko ministarstvo finansija (Joint Ministry of Finance, hereafter ZMF), 1903/5593, Interpellation des Abgeordneten Georg Schönerer und Genossen, 2 May 1903.
3. Ibid.
4. Due to restricted language knowledge, I was not able to include media coverage in Hungarian.
5. For a discussion of the contributions of new imperial history in the case of Habsburg Empire, see Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*.
6. Osterkamp, 'Cooperative Empire', 144.
7. Osterkamp, *Kooperatives Imperium*.
8. Ibid., 6. On the idea of the radiating imperial governance, see Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt*, 614.
9. Grunert, 'Interreligiöse Konkurrenz'.
10. Marchet, *Holzproduktion*, 314–16.
11. Cederlöf and Shivaramakrishnan, *Ecological Nationalisms*, 2.
12. Hajdapašić, *Whose Bosnia?*
13. Söderlund, *Swedish Timber Exports*, 195.
14. On the concept of European timber market sphere, see Bemann, 'Wood-Based Businesses'.
15. Marchet, *Holzproduktion*, 212, 217.
16. Ibid., 320–321.
17. See Robert Skenderović's chapter in this volume.
18. Marchet, *Holzproduktion*, 326.
19. Dimitz, *Die forstlichen Verhältnisse*, 115.
20. Petraschek, 'Forstwirtschaft', 467.
21. Marchet, *Holzproduktion*, 213.
22. Ibid., 318.
23. *Bericht über die Verwaltung*, 110.
24. Lučić, 'Law of the Forests'.
25. On Bosnia as Habsburg's only colony, see Ruthner and Scheer, *Bosnien-Herzegowina und Österreich-Ungarn*. The term 'proxy colony' was introduced by Robert Donia; see Donia, 'The Proximate Colony'.
26. Kraljačić, *Kalajev režim*, 436.
27. Söderlund, *Swedish Timber Exports*, 195.
28. ABiH, ZMF, 1886/5636, Denkschrift betreff Verwerthung der überalten und schlag-

- baren Eichenbestände in Bosnien, Beilage 5, Faßdaubenstatistik der Jahre 1859 bis 1889.
29. 'Holzindustrie- und Handel Bosniens', *Österreichische Forst- und Jagdzeitung* no. 27 (1891), 5.
 30. ABiH, ZMF, 1886/5636, Denkschrift betreff Verwerthung der überalten und schlagbaren Eichenbestände in Bosnien, Beilage 5, Faßdaubenstatistik der Jahre 1859 bis 1889.
 31. Ibid., Beilage 12, Ausweis über die b.h. Staatswaldfläche überhaupt, sowie nach Betriebs- und Waldarten.
 32. Ibid., Beilage 4, Ausweis über Submissionswege verkauften Eichenstämme.
 33. Ibid., Beilage 3, Ausweis über die um vereinbarte Preise verkauften Eichenstämme.
 34. Ibid., Beilage 5, Fassdaubenstatistik der Jahre 1859 bis 1889.
 35. Ibid., Beilage 2, Herkunft der Fassdauben.
 36. ABiH, ZMF, 1880/151, Bericht an das Finanzministerium seitens der Finanzlandesdirektion in Sarajevo bezüglich der Schlagabrechnung mit der Sisseker Credit-Bank in der Faßdaubenangelegenheit Kalina.
 37. White, *Blood of the Colony*, 40; Heath, 'The Color of French Wine', 93–94.
 38. Anonymous, 'Der Niedergang'.
 39. Anonymous, 'Finanzminister Kállay'.
 40. ABiH, ZMF, 1886/5636, Denkschrift betreff Verwerthung der überalten und schlagbaren Eichenbestände in Bosnien, Beilage 6, Adresse, welche die croatischen Grossholzhändler Banus am 1. April 1886 in Angelegenheit der Fassdaubenhandels überreichten; Anonymous, 'Fassdaubenhandel'.
 41. Müller, 'Der cisleithanische Industrierat', 60.
 42. ABiH, ZMF, 1886/5636, Denkschrift betreff Verwerthung der überalten und schlagbaren Eichenbestände in Bosnien, Beilage 6, Adresse, welche die croatischen Grossholzhändler Banus am 1. April 1886 in Angelegenheit des Fassdaubenhandels überreichten.
 43. Anonymous, 'Bosniens Faßdaubenhandel'.
 44. ABiH, ZMF, 1886/5636, Denkschrift betreff Verwerthung der überalten und schlagbaren Eichenbestände in Bosnien, Beilage 13, Ausweis über die Nutzungsfläche, welche für die Ausführung der Eichenstammverkäufe beansprucht sind und jene Eichenwaldfläche, welche als ungenutzt erübrigt.
 45. Sugar, *Industrialization*, 136.
 46. Ballian and Memišević-Hodžić, *Hrasta Lužnjaka*, 19.
 47. Anonymous, 'Fassdaubenhandel'.
 48. Anonymous, 'Der Niedergang'.
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